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AN UNNATURAL READING: THE REVISIONIST HISTORY OF
ABORTION IN HODES V. SCHMIDT
Skylar Reese Croy* & Alexander Lemke**
"All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights,
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."'
Abstract
Recently, in Hodes v. Schmidt,2 the Kansas Supreme Court concluded
that women have a natural right to procure an abortion and that this right
is subject to broader protection than afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Hodes relied on some of the most influential jurists and
philosophers in legal history to support its reasoning, including John
Locke, Edward Coke, and William Blackstone. Hodes explained that
these jurists and philosophers acknowledged a natural right to bodily
autonomy, and we agree with that proposition. However, in this Article,
we demonstrate that Hodes failed to acknowledge specific statements
from these jurists and philosophers condemning abortion. They did not
believe that the natural right to bodily autonomy encompassed the right
to procure an abortion. Hodes further erred by referencing specific
statements on matters unrelated to abortion to support its conclusion. The
court's errors created a precedent with far-reaching implications. For
example, under a fair reading of Hodes, Kansans have a natural right to
assisted suicide.
We conclude that Hodes illustrates the danger of courts
acknowledging natural rights. If courts are going to do so, they must
exercise caution and restraint.
Hodes has broad significance because it relied on Section 1 of the
Kansas Bill of Rights. Identical or substantially similar language exists
in thirty-three other state constitutions. Pro-choice advocates may
reference Hodes in other jurisdictions with the hope of achieving broader
protection for abortion rights than afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, arguably, federal courts are becoming less
favorable forums for pro-choice advocates. Moreover, there are other
consequences to acknowledging a natural right. We hope to call into
question the legitimacy of Hodes so as to limit its reach.

* J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School.
** J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. - KAN. CONST. Bill. of Rights § 1.
2. 440 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam).
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INTRODUCTION

Recently, in Hodes v. Schmidt, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded
that women have a natural right to procure an abortion, protected by
Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights, and that this right is subject to
3
broader protection than afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. That is
a momentous holding.
For context, a natural right predates government.4 When people create
a government, they delegate to it the authority to protect their natural
rights. 5 Once the government is formed, civil rights are created to address
7
certain concerns. 6 For example, freedom of speech is a natural right.
3. Id at 466.
4. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF

LIBERTY 44 (2014).

5. Id at 70-71, 330-32.

Id; Philip A. Hamburger,
102 YALE L. REV. 907, 909 (1993).
6.

Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,

7. Hamburger, supra note 6, at 908-09.

AN UNNATURAL READING

20211

73

However, the right to vote is a civil right because it can exist only after
the formation of a government.8 A natural right deserves significant
protection-perhaps more than a civil right-because the impetus of
forming a government is to protect natural rights. 9 Therefore, any
government that restricts natural rights-unless it is acting to protect
other natural rights-calls into question its legitimacy. 10
Evidently, acknowledging a natural right has consequences. When the
Hodes court concluded that women have a natural right to procure an
abortion, it was effectively declaring not only that any act restricting the
ability to procure an abortion is presumably unconstitutional, but it was
also implying that any restriction presumably constitutes a grave
injustice.
Hodes relied on some of the most influential jurists and philosophers
in legal history. 11 In relying on these sources, the court reasoned: (1) all
persons have a natural right to bodily autonomy, and (2) the right to
bodily autonomy includes the ability to "control one's own body."12
Therefore, in the court's words, "[t]his right allows a woman to make her
own decisions regarding her body, health, family formation, and family
life-decisions that can include whether to continue a pregnancy." 13
We argue that Hodes misapplied several historical sources to support
its conclusion. Hodes took general statements from sources about bodily
autonomy, but it did not acknowledge that many of those same sources
have specific statements condemning abortion. For instance, Hodes
quoted William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of Englandfor
the proposition that life, liberty, and property are "absolute" rights,
meaning rights "not dependent upon the will of the government."14 But
Hodes did not acknowledge that Blackstone, in the same work-indeed,
in the same page range cited by Hodes-called abortion after quickening

8. Cf BARNETT, supra note 4, at 71 ("When 'surrendering' one's executive power to the
government, however, one receives in return a 'civil' right to have one's retained rights protected
by the police power now in the hands of the civil government. This civil right to 'the protection
of the laws,' is the root of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that
mandates that no state shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.').
9. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 70-71, 330-32; see also James Wilson, Of the NaturalRights
of Individuals(lecture given between 1790-92), reprintedin 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 335

(1896) ("1 here close my examination into those natural rights, which, in my humble opinion, it is
the business of civil government to protect, and not to subvert, and the exercise of which it is the
duty of civil government to enlarge, and not to restrain.").
10. See BARNETT, supra note 4.

11. Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 480-81 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 466.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 481 (citing I
*123, *129-38 (1765)).

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
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a "heinous misdemeanor."' 5 At other points, Hodes utilized specific
statements from these commentators about the right to bodily autonomy
in other contexts while never acknowledging they addressed abortion. For
example, the court noted that "Edward Coke observed that an ordinance
setting requirements on the clothes that certain merchants could wear was
against the law of the land, 'because it was against the liberty of the
subject, for every subject hath freedom to put his clothes to be dressed by
whom he will."' 16 While this statement is specific, it is seemingly
irrelevant, especially given that Coke made specific statements
condemning abortion.' 7 Furthermore, Hodes did not address several
sources contradicting its conclusion. For example, James Wilson, a key
founding father, natural law scholar, and one of the first justices to sit on
the U.S. Supreme Court, stated:
With consistency, beautiful and undeviating, human life,
from its commencement to its close, is protected by the
common law. In the contemplation of law, life begins when
the infant is first able to stir in the womb. By the law, life is
protected not only from immediate destruction, but from
every degree of actual violence, and, in some cases, from
every degree of danger. 18
Bluntly stated, Hodes' analysis of the historical record is wrong.
Furthermore, Hodes' reliance on general statements to the exclusion
of specific statements, in combination with its reliance on specific
statements made in a context unrelated to abortion, contravenes reason
and has created a precedent that could lead to absurd results. For example,
assisted suicide is arguably a constitutional right in Kansas after Hodes.19
We conclude that judges must exercise caution and restraint before they
acknowledge a natural right.
Moreover, Hodes is significant for several reasons. First, clauses like
Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights, which are often called "natural
21
rights guarantees," 2 0 exist in thirty-three other state constitutions
15. BLACKSTONE, supra note

mifdemefnor").
16. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 481

14, at *130

(original publication contains "heinous

(quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
47-48, 150 (1957)).

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY

17. Infra Part II.B.2.

18. Wilson, supra note 9, at 316 (citation omitted).
19. Infra Part I.B.
20. Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the FourteenthAmendment:
The Original Understandingof the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees, 93 TEx. L. REV. 1299,

1303 (2015).
21. Other states include: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1), Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. 1,
(ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2), California (CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1), Colorado (COLO.

§ 1), Arkansas
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Second, the Kansas Supreme Court in construing Section 1 recognized a
broader right than afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Third,
Hodes represents a change in how these natural rights guarantees are
utilized. Before the Reconstruction Amendments, natural rights
guarantees in the states played an important role in American
jurisprudence; 2 3 however; in the twentieth century, these rights were
generally construed in lockstep with the Fourteenth Amendment. 24
Indeed, some states, such as Illinois, have treated natural rights
guarantees as "mostly hortatory, stating ideals rather than setting specific
standards." 2 5 Fourth, Hodes indicates a strategic shift in pro-choice
impact litigation. Litigants, recognizing that federal forums are becoming
increasingly hostile, are turning to state courts. 2 6
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we provide an overview
of Hodes and discuss its absurd breadth. 27 In Part II, we examine several
of the historical sources on which Hodes relied. 28 We demonstrate that
many of these sources contain specific statements condemning abortion
that were not acknowledged. We argue that these specific statements
should have governed if the court was going to rely on these sources. At
a minimum, the court should have explained why the specific statements
did not govern. Additionally, we consider several sources not addressed
in Hodes. In Part III, we analyze the implications of Hodes and why its
misuse of historical sources matters. 2 9

CONST. art. 2, § 3), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 2), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ I), Hawaii
(HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 2), Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1), Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1), Indiana
(IND. CONST. art. 1, § 1), Iowa (IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 1), Maine (ME. CONST. art. 1, § 1),
Massachusetts (MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 1), Missouri (MO. CONST. art. 1, § 2), Montana (MONT.
CONST. art. 2, § 3), Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1), Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 1), New
Hampshire (N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 2), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 1), New Mexico (N.M.
CONST. art. 2, § 4), North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1), North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. 1,
§ 1), Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2), Oregon (OR. CONST.
art. I, § 1), Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1), South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 1), Utah
(UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 1), Vermont (VT. CONST. Ch I, art. 1), Virginia (VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1),
West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 1), and Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1).

22. Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 472 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam).
23. See generally Calabresi & Vickery, supra note 20.

24. E.g., Cty. of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt, Inc., 588 N.W.2d 236 (Wis. 1999); Sheriff of
Houston County v. Albertson's, Inc., 402 So.2d 912 (Ala. 1981).
25. ILL. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION, ANNOTATED FOR
LEGISLATORS (5th ed. 2018), https://www.ilga.gov/commission/lru/ILConstitution2Ol8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6QZ-WPYN].
26. Infra Part III.A.
27. See infra Part I.
28. See infra Part II.

29. See infra Part III.
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I. HODESAND ITS BREADTH

A. An Overview of Hodes
The dispute in Hodes began with the enactment of Senate Bill 95, the
Kansas Unborn Child Protection from Dismemberment Abortion Act
(Bill 95).30 Bill 95 was intended to prohibit a specific abortion methodDilation and Evacuation (D&E)-except when "necessary to preserve the
life of the pregnant woman" or to prevent a "substantial and irreversible
physical impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant
woman." 31 For context, Bill 95 referred to D&E abortions as
"dismemberment abortion[s]," which it defined as:
[W]ith the purpose of causing death of an unborn child,
knowingly dismembering a living unborn child and
extracting such unborn child one piece at a time from the
uterus through the use of clamps, grasping forceps, tongs,
scissors or similar instruments that, through the convergence
of two rigid levers, slice, crush or grasp a portion of the
32
unborn child's body in order to cut or rip it off.
Physicians who performed abortions challenged Bill 95 and sought an
injunction to preclude the law from taking effect.33 The crux of their
argument was that D&E is the safest method of abortion during the
second trimester and, therefore, Bill 95 restricted the right to procure an
abortion in violation of Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights. 34 In other
words, the physicians argued that the restrictions "infringe[d] on
inalienable natural rights, specifically, the right to liberty." 3 5 This framed
the issue in such a way that the question squarely before the court was
whether women have a natural right to procure an abortion protected by
the Kansas Constitution.

30. 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 22.
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6743(a) (2019).
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6742(b)(1) (2019). With the enactment of Bill 95, Kansas sought
to join other states that had restricted D&E. Notably, Mississippi and West Virginia have D&E
bans currently in force. Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester,

GUTTMACHER INST. (Updated July 1, 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/
explore/bans-specific-abortion-methods-used-after-first-trimester [https://perma.cc/M4FW-PVE3].
Several other states have enacted similar legislation that has been temporarily or permanently

enjoined. Id.
33. Hodes'v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 467 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 466-67. The physicians also challenged Bill 95 under Section 2 of the Kansas Bill
of Rights, which provides, in relevant part: "All political power is inherent in the people, and all
free governments are founded on their authority, and are instituted for their equal protection and
benefit." KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 2. Notably, Hodes relied exclusively on Section 1 to reach

its conclusion. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 467.
35. Id. at 467.
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In a per curiam opinion, the Kansas Supreme Court accepted the
physicians' argument and upheld the trial court's decision to temporarily
enjoin Bill 95.36 The opinion is lengthy, but its reasoning can be distilled
into three components: (1) the court, relying on some of the most
influential jurists and philosophers in legal history, noted that people have
a "right of personal autonomy, which includes the ability to control one's
own body, to assert bodily integrity, and to exercise selfdetermination"; 37 (2) this natural right to bodily autonomy, the court said,
is "[a]t the heart of a natural rights philosophy"; 3 8 and (3) therefore, the
court concluded, the natural right to bodily autonomy "allows a woman
to make her own decisions regarding her body, health, family formation,
and family life-decisions that can include whether to continue a
pregnancy." 39
The court further noted that a woman's right to procure an abortion
was broader under Section 1 than under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 0
U.S. Supreme Court precedent has established an "undue burden" test to
review restrictions on abortion.41 The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the
undue burden test and instead reviewed Bill 95 under a more stringent
standard of review: strict scrutiny. 4 2 But it failed to examine the
implications of a right so broadly construed. 4 3
B. Hodes' Breadth
Hodes started with an uncontroversial premise-that a woman has a
natural right to "continue a pregnancy"-and reached a controversial
conclusion: that a woman has a natural right to end a pregnancy. Shortly
after Hodes, a professor at Friends University in Wichita, Kansas, noted
that the decision was "anything but simple."44 He also stated that "an
inalienable natural guarantee of complete bodily autonomy" is a "rather
audacious thing for a state court to claim[.]" 4 5 We agree.
One problem with Hodes is that it articulated a view of the right to
bodily autonomy that has traditionally been rejected. Hodes ignored that
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 502.
Hodes, 440 P.3d at 472.

41. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915-17

(1992) (plurality opinion).
42. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 496.
43. For a recent law review article speculating about the implications, see Richard E. Levy,

Constitutional Rights in Kansas After Hodes & Nauser, 68 KAN. L. REv. 743 (2020).
44. Russell Arben Fox, Opinion, Kansas Supreme Court's Abortion Decision Is More

Complex than the PoliticalArguments, WICHITA

EAGLE

opinion/guest-commentary/article230003034.html.

45. Id.

(May 5, 2019), https://www.kansas.com/
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the natural right is limited by various natural duties, such as the duty of
self-preservation. 46 How these duties shape the contours of the right is
hard to determine. However, there are two clear principles: (1) the right
limits what the State can do to a person's body without consent, and (2)
the right is not without limits in the case of morally suspect actions.
First, unquestionably, the right to bodily autonomy provides a shield
of protection from the State. For example, the State cannot forcefully
medicate an individual without an "essential" or "overriding" state
interest and due process. 47 Nor can the State force a person to donate body
parts even if doing so would save the life of another and have minimal
long-term consequences for the person. 4 8
But, second, the right to bodily autonomy does not prevent the State
from limiting what people can do with their bodies insofar as the
decisions in question are morally suspect. For example, government can
prohibit people from using drugs.4 9 Additionally, it can prohibit
euthanasia. 50 Indeed, suicide was illegal at common law.5 As Blackstone
explained:
[T]he law of England wisely and religiously considers, that
no man hath a power to destroy life, but by commission from
God, the author of it: and, as the suicide is guilty of a double
offence; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the
Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled
for; the other temporal, against the king, who hath an interest
in the preservation of all his subjects; the law has therefore
ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar
52
species of felony, a felony committed on oneself.
The version of the right to bodily autonomy discussed in Hodes is
simply inaccurate because Hodes implied that the right is limitless. 53
Hodes attempted to rely on the first principle, but it ignored the
second. The court repeatedly referred to a woman's right to "continue a
pregnancy" 54 as if the issue were whether the government could force a
woman to receive an abortion. But that was not the issue. And insofar as
the government was forcing women to continue their pregnancy, an
analogous argument could be made when a person wants to die: the State
46. Valerie L. Myers, Note, Vacco v. Quill andthe Inalienable Right to Life, 11 REGENT U.
L. REV. 373, 392 (1998).
47. E.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
48. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90, 92 (1978).
49. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
50. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997).
51. Id. at 711-12.
52. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, vol. 4, at *189 (1769).
53. See Hodes, 440 P.3d at 491-92.
54. Id. at 470-71.
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is forcing that person to live by prohibiting euthanasia. Simply put,
contrary to the implications of Hodes, the right to bodily autonomy
should not be understood as a license for individuals to do whatever it is
they please with their bodies, free of all moral considerations. 55
And by ignoring the second principle, Hodes did not perform a
thorough analysis. Specifically, it did not consider whether a woman's
right to bodily autonomy is limited in any way. 56 Relying on a U.S.
Supreme Court case, Hodes noted that a fetus is not a "person" and simply
assumed that a fetus has no rights of its own.5 7 But Hodes was quick to
perform other parts of its analysis independent of U.S. Supreme Court
cases, so Hodes seemingly should have independently analyzed whether
a fetus has rights. Had Hodes looked to the same sources it used to define
the right to bodily autonomy to determine Whether a fetus possesses
rights, it would have struggled to explain that a fetus post-quickening
lacks any moral consideration that might justify government
intervention. 58

Ignoring the second principle has practical implications. If a person
wants to take his or her life, what interest does the State have in
preventing him or her in a post-Hodes Kansas? Suicide is seemingly
between the individual and his or her doctor under Hodes.59 Similarly, is
medical self-defense now legal in Kansas? 6 0 Can Kansas require citizens
to wear seatbelts or, in the age of COVID-19, face coverings?
Indeed, Professor Richard E. Levy, who teaches constitutional law at
the University of Kansas School of Law, has indicated that a fair reading
of Hodes supports a "right to die." 6 1 Another Kansas professor has argued
that, because Hodes based the natural right to procure an abortion on the
55. Ryan T. Anderson, Physician-AssistedSuicide Betrays Human Dignity and Violates
Equality Before the Law, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (May 11, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/health
-care-reform/report/physician-assisted-suicide-betrays-human-dignity-and-violates-equality
[https://perma.cc/XYW6-2J7Q].
56. See generally Hodes, 440 P.3d. at 467-69.

57. Id. at 467 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973)).
58. E.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *129 ("Life is the immediate gift of God, a right
inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant
is able to stir in the mother's womb.").
59. See Hodes, 440 P.3d at 484 ("At the core of the natural rights of liberty and the pursuit
of happiness is the right of personal autonomy, which includes the ability to control one's own
body, to assert bodily integrity, and to exercise self-determination. This ability enables decisionmaking about issues that affect one's physical health, family formation, and family life. Each of
us has the right to make self-defining and self-governing decisions about these matters.").
60. Medical self-defense is the right to purchase drugs that have not been fully approved by

a government entity. See generally Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1813 (2007) (discussing
the use of medical self-defense to assist terminal patients with obtaining permission to take
experimental drugs).
61. Levy, supra note 43, at 775-76.
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right to bodily autonomy, it introduced:
[A] host of questions that the court provides no guidance for.
(Is "bodily integrity" to be understood as solely referring to
the right of women to control their own pregnancies, or does
it also imply that any Kansas law which places restrictions
on what people choose to do with their bodies-like, that I
must clothe my body while in public places, or that a child's
body must be vaccinated before she attends elementary
school-must be presumed to be unconstitutional?) 62
Hodes did not deal with the breadth of its reasoning. It appears to
contain no limiting principle. 63
II. CLARIFYING THE HISTORICAL RECORD
Hodes' breadth is attributable, partly, to its failure to understand the
historical record on which it relied. Our purpose in this Part is to describe
the unsound way that Hodes reached its conclusion that the natural right
to bodily autonomy includes a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy.
Hodes relied on several historical sources that acknowledge a natural
right to bodily autonomy; however, with respect to abortion, the sources
restrict that right because they consider the fetus to have its own natural
rights. Furthermore, while Hodes occasionally utilized specific
statements from these authorities, it utilized specific statements unrelated
to abortion-an odd analysis indeed. In addition, we provide several
sources-never mentioned in Hodes-that demonstrate that the right to
bodily autonomy does not include the right to procure an abortion. We
also argue that specific statements must govern over general statements
if a court is going to justify its opinion by reference to historical
authorities. At a minimum, the court should have explained why the
specific statements did not impact or govern its analysis.
A. Why Hodes CitedHistoricalSources
Interestingly, Hodes acknowledged the legitimacy that reference to
historical sources can bring. It stated:
[T]he Doctors assert that the following natural rights
underlie the right of a woman to decide whether to continue
a pregnancy: personal autonomy and decision-making about
issues that affect one's physical health, family formation,
and family life. To test these assertions, we look to the

62. Fox, supra note 44.

63. See Hodes, 440 P.3d at 517 (Stegall, I., dissenting).
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historical and philosophical basis for considering those
rights as "natural." 64
The historical authorities Hodes cited are all pillars of Western legal
and political thought. One scholar has stated that "Locke is generally
considered by American historians and legal scholars alike as a major
influence on the leaders of the American Revolution." 65 The former dean
of the Ave Maria School of Law once wrote that "no writer in the
intervening period approached Lord Coke in providing as complete and
authoritative [an] overview of the common law." 66 And, just this past
term, in an opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the U.S. Supreme
Court described Blackstone's influence on the American founding
generation as "the most profound." 67 In essence, Hodes referenced these
sources because it recognized the gravitas associated with citing them.
But if a court is going to use such sources, it must use them faithfully.
For instance, Hodes asserted that "[t]he philosophy of Locke and others
recognized personal autonomy and bodily integrity as natural rights." 68
That is true, but these commentators-specifically, (1) John Locke; (2)
Edward Coke; and (3) William Blackstone-condemned abortion; a
point never mentioned in Hodes. Notably, numerous briefs were filed in
Hodes, but none of them referred to these commentators. 69 Therefore,
Hodes cited them sua sponte, and the check inherent to the adversarial
system never occurred. 70 Part of our purpose is to provide that check. 71

64. Id. at 480 (per curiam) (emphasis added).
65. H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be Peaceful Coexistence of
Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203, 226 (1999).
66. Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and
What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 776-77 (2004).

67. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1041 (2020).
68. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 480.

69. See Appellate Briefs, Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2019) (No. 114,153).
70. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 480.
.71. The dissent did not focus on the sources cited by the per curiam opinion, but it did note

that:
Reading today's majority opinion is a follow-the-white-rabbit experience. One
is left feeling like Alice, invited by the Queen to believe "as many as six
impossible things before breakfast." Indeed, the story told by the majority is a
strange one. In it, all the luminaries of the western legal tradition-from Sir
Edward Coke and William Blackstone to Edmund Burke and Thomas
Jefferson-would celebrate and enshrine a right to nearly unfettered abortion
access. In this imagined world, the Liberty Bell rings every time a baby in utero
loses her arm.

Id. at 517 (Stegall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). We speculate that the dissent's statement was
born out of an implicit recognition that the per curiam's use of these jurists and philosophers was,
at best, incomplete.

82

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol.

32

B. The Authorities Hodes Misapplied
1. John Locke
Hodes quoted the second volume of Locke's An Essay Concerning
Human Understandingfor its proposition that: "so far as a man has power
to think, or not to think: to move or not to move, according to the
preference or direction of his own mind; so far is a man free." 72 Hodes
did not acknowledge that the first volume of Locke's work explicitly
condemned abortion:
When it shall be made out, that men ignorant of words, or
untaught by the laws and customs of their country, know that
it is part of the worship of God, Not to kill another man; Not
to know more women than one; Not to procureAbortion; not
to expose their Children; Not to take from another what is
his, though we want it ourselves, but on the contrary, relieve
and supply his wants; and whenever we have done the
contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so
no more; When, I say, all men shall be proved actually to
know and allow all these and a thousand other such rules, all
which come under these two general words made use of
above, viz. virtutes & peccata, virtues and sins, there will be
more reason for admitting these and the like, for common
notions and practical principles. 73
Professor Eric Manchester, a pro-life academic, citing this passage,
has explained that Locke "list[ed] abortion among the most obviously
immoral actions. Incredibly, this comment seems to have gone almost
unnoticed by scholars." 74
Hodes also quoted the second volume of Locke's Two Treatises of
Government for the proposition that "every Man has a Property in his
own Person." 75 Reliance on this work is problematic for two reasons.
First, Hodes never considered that Locke might have believed in the
personhood of the fetus. In one letter, Locke wrote, "[fjor since from the
76
first conception and beginning of formation, [an embryo] has life."

72. Id. at 480 (per curiam) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, 2 AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING, ch. 1, § 8 (27th ed. 1836) (1690) [hereinafter HUMAN UNDERSTANDING]

73. HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 73, at ch. 3, § 19 (first emphasis added).
74. Eric Manchester, Locke on Bodily Rights and the Immorality of Abortion: A Neglected
LiberalPerspective, in 16 U. FAC. LIFE & LEARNING CONF. PROC. 383, 384 (Joseph W. Koterski

ed. 2006), http://www.uffi.org/vol16/manchester06.pdf [https:/perma.cc/Q4UZ-MWN7].
75. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 480 (quoting JoHN LOCKE, 2 Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(1690) [hereinafter Two TREATISES]).
76. JOHN LOCKE, 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 77 (Scientia Verlag Aalen 1963).
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Locke was a medical doctor, so he was versed in these matters.7 7 As one
article summarized, "[t]he study of Locke's medical ethics confirms that
he was a deontologist who opposed all suicide and abortion through much
of pregnancy." 78 The article considered many versions of the Hippocratic
Oath from Locke's era. 7 9 For example, one version, published in 1586,
provided: "That I shall not (although I be thereunto required) give deadly
poison to any person; neither counsel the same to any other; nor give it to
any woman being with child, to kill the infant in her womb." ° Given
Locke's medical background, some passages in Two Treatises of
Government can, arguably, be interpreted to support the personhood of a
fetus. 81

Second, Locke did not believe that people had an absolute property
right in their person. 82 He believed that God was the true owner of a
person's body. 83 For this reason, quite famously, Locke condemned
suicide in the second volume of Two Treatises of Government:
[The] freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so
necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation,
that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his
preservation and life together: for a man, not having the
power of his own life, cannot, by compact or his own
consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under
the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his
life, when he pleases. No body can give more power than he
has himself- and he that cannot take away his own ife,
cannot give anotherpower over it.84

Hodes did not contend with the limits on the right to bodily autonomy
outlined in Locke's Two Treatisesof Government. As already mentioned,
under a fair reading of Hodes, assisted suicide is now legal in Kansas. 85
But, no doubt, Locke would have disagreed with such a broad
understanding of bodily autonomy.

77.
ISSUES L.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Bradford William Short, The Healing Philosopher:John Locke's Medical Ethics, 20
& MED. 103 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 121-25.
Id at 123 (quoting THOMAS NEWTON, THE OLDE MANS DIETARIE (London 1586)).
Id. at 127.

82. See Two TREATISES, supra note 75, at ch. 4, § 23.
83. See id. at ch.14, § 168 ("God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself,
as to neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give
another power to take it.").

84. Id. at ch. 4,

§ 23 (emphasis added).

85. Supra Part

I.B.
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2. Edward Coke
Hodes also referenced Coke's Institute of the Lawes of England.86
Specifically, Hodes stated: "Edward Coke observed that an ordinance
setting requirements on the clothes that certain merchants could wear was
against the law of the land, 'because it was against the liberty, for every
subject bath freedom to put his clothes to be dressed by whom he will."' 87
But in the third volume of the same work, Coke explained: "If a woman
be quick with child[], and by a potion or otherwi[s]e killeth it in her
wombH; or if a man beat her, whereby the child[] dieth in her body, and
[s]he is delivered a dead child[, this is a great mi[s]pri[s]ion, and no
"88 By "great misprision," Coke meant "serious
murder .
89
misdemeanor."
The use of Coke in Hodes is particularly strange. Hodes cited Coke's
views on the legality of an ordinance regulating merchant attire. 9 0 We
believe that context is illustrative of just how useless the referenced
material is for establishing a natural right to procure an abortion. The
entirety of the referenced passage is clearly about the illegality of
monopolies. Whether the passage is even about the right to bodily
autonomy is debatable. We think a fairer ,reading is that it is about
economic liberty:
This word, libertates,liberties, hath three [s]ignifications:
1. Fir[s]t, as it hath been [s]aid, it [s]ignifieth the Laws of the
Realm, in which re[s]pect this Charter is called, Charta
libertatum.
2. It [s]ignifieth the freedoms that the Subjects of England
have; For example, the Company of the Merchant Tailors of
England,having power by their Charter to make Ordinances,
made an Ordinance, that every brother of the [s]ame Society
[s]hould put the one half of his clothes to be dre[ss]ed by
[s]ome Clothmaker free of the fame Company, upon pain to
forfeit [etc.] and it was adjudged that this Ordinance was
again[s]t Law, becau[s]e it was again[s]t the Liberty of the
Subject, for every Subject hath freedom to put his clothes to
be dre[ss]ed by whom he will, & [s]ic de [s]imilibus: And
[s]o it is, if [s]uch or the like grant had been made by his
Letters Patents.

86. See Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 481 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam).
87. Id. (quoting POUND, supra note 16, at 47-48, 150).

88.

EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTE OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 50 (London

1648).

89. Joshua J. Craddock, Note, Protecting Prenatal Persons: Does the Fourteenth
Amendment ProhibitAbortion?, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 553 (2017) (citing Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113, 156-57).
90. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 481.
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3. Liberties [s]ignifieth the franchi[s]es, and priviledges,
which the Subjects have of the gift of the King, as the goods,
and chattels of felons, outlaws, and the like, or which the
Subject claims by prescription, as wreck, waif, [s]tray, and

the like.
So likewi[s]e, and for the [s]ame rea[s]on, if a grant be made
to any man, to have the [s]ole making of Cards, or the [s]ole
dealing with any other trade, that grant is against the liberty,
and freedom of the Subject, that before did, or lawfully
might have u[s]ed that trade, and con[s]equently again[s]t
this great Charter.
Generally all monopolies are again[s]t this great Charter,
because they are again[s]t the liberty and freedom of the
Subject, and again[s]t the Law of the Land. 9 1
To reference this passage in a case about abortion, while not
acknowledging a specific statement on abortion in the same work, leaves
us dumbfounded. Coke would have likely taken grave issue with Hodes's
conclusion given his own statements on abortion and the statements
Hodes used from Coke concerning his opinions on an ordinance
regulating merchant attire are beside the point.
3. William Blackstone
Hodes further perpetuated its error by relying on Blackstone. It stated:
William Blackstone in his Commentaries identified the
private rights to life, liberty, and property as three "absolute"
rights-so called because they "appertain[ed]
and
belong[ed] to particular men, merely as individuals," not "to
them as members of society [or] standing in various relations
to each other"-that is, not dependent upon the will of the
government. 9 2

However, in his first volume, Blackstone also wrote:
I. THE right of per[s]onal [s]ecurity con[s]i[s]ts in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation.
1. LIFE is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by
nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of
law as [s]oon as an infant is able to [s]tir in the mother's
womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion,
91. COKE, supra note 88, vol. 2, at 47.
92. Hodes, 440 P.3d at 481 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at * 123, *129-38)
(alterations in original).
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or otherwi[s]e, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body, and [s]he is delivered of
a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the an[c]ient
law homicide or man[s]laughter. But Edward Coke doth not
look upon this offence in quite [s]o atrocious a light, but
merely as a heinous mi[sdemeanor].
AN infant in ventre [s]a mere, or in the mother's womb, is
[s]uppo[s]ed in law to be born for many purpo[s]es. 93
We note that this passage about abortion begins at the end of page 129
of his first volume, and the court cited page 123 and pages 129 to 138.94
That is to say, Blackstone's statement on abortion is in the same page
range considered by the court.
In a different volume of the same work, Blackstone further wrote:
To kill a child in its mother's womb, is now no murder, but
a great misprision: but if the child be born alive, and dieth
by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it
seems ... to be murder in such as administered or gave
them. 9 5
Blackstone, no doubt, also would have contested Hodes' conclusion
that a natural right to procure an abortion exists.
C. Sources Not Acknowledged in Hodes
In addition to many of the sources cited by Hodes, several other
sources contradict its conclusion. That is to say, the debate about whether
there is a natural right to procure an abortion is not a close call. And had
the court taken the time to examine the historical record, it surely would
have noticed that.
Several commentators on English law wrote that abortion was a
criminal act. Sir Matthew Hale authored The History of the Pleas of the
Crown, which was published in 1736.96 His work provided that abortion
"is not murder nor man[s] laughter by the law of England, becau[s]e [the
child] is not yet in rerum natura, tho it be a great crime." 97 Around the
same time, William Hawkins, author of A Treatise of the Pleas of the
Crown, wrote: "And it was anciently holden, that the cau[s]ing of an
abortion, by giving a potion to, or [s]triking a woman big with child, was

93. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at * 129-30.
94. Id.; Hodes; 440 P.3d at 481.
95. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, vol. 4, at *198 (citation omitted).

96.

MATTHEW HALE,

97. Id at 433.

1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS

OF THE CROWN (London

1736).

AN UNNATURAL READING

2021 ]

87

murder. But at this day it is [s]aid to be a great mi[s]pri[s]ion. ... "98 A
few decades later, Sir William Oldnall Russell, author of A Treatise on
Crime and Misdemeanors, explained:
We have already seen, that an infant in its mother's womb,
not being in rerum natura, is not considered as a person who
can be killed within the description of murder.[] An attempt,
however, to effect the destruction of such an infant, though
unsuccessful, appears to have been treated as a misdemeanor
at common law. 9
English commentators are not the only ones to have condemned
abortion. Notably, there were several prosecutions in the colonies for
abortion. Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna, a law professor and historian,
has dedicated substantial time documenting these prosecutions. 100
Additionally, modern scholars have cited statutes from the colonial
period, such as a 1716 law from New York City that criminalized
"administer[ing] any herb medicine or potion or any other thing to an
woman being with child whereby she should destroy or miscarry."1 1
James Wilson, a key founding father, natural law scholar, and one of the
first justices to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court, notably condemned
abortion. 102
Even the earliest sources of common law were against abortion. The
Leges HenriciPrimi, or Laws of Henry I, is traced to approximately 1114
A.D. The leading translation was edited by L.J. Downer, who
commented:
[T]he work is something of a mixture, made up of the old
traditional law, the developing feudal principles, and
provisions based on royal supremacy, as a result of which
government and the administration of justice are more and
more centralized. The picture accords well with evidence
available from other sources, and it shows a continuing

98. WILLIAM HAWKINS,

I

A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR, A SYSTEM OF THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 188

(7th

ed.)

(London 1795).
99. WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL,

ed. 1850).
100. JOSEPH
(2006).

1 A TREATISE ON

CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS

*671 (2d

W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 215-28

101. Duane L. Ostler, A Conversation About Abortion Between Justice Blackmun and the
Founding Fathers,29 CONST. COMM. 167, 168-69 (2014) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting 3
MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1675-1776,

102. Wilson, supra note 9, at 316.

at 122 (1905)).
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progress of the law in an age when the common law can at
best be described as only formative.10 3
The historian Patrick Wormald said the work "has had more effect on
views of English law before Henry II than any other."104 The first
complete print of the work occurred in 1644.105 Before this, great scholars
and legal minds such as Coke had studied it.1 1 6
The Leges HenriciPrimi states:
If a pregnant woman is slain, and the child in her is living,
each shall be compensated for by the full wergeld.
If the child is not yet living, half the wergeld shall be paid to
the relatives, based on the paternal relationship.

Women who commit fornication and destroy their embryos,
and those who are accessories with them, so that they abort
the fetus from the womb, are by an ancient ordinance
excommunicated from the church until death.
A milder provision has now been introduced: they shall do
penance for ten years.
A woman shall do penance for three years if she intentionally
brings about the loss of her embryo before forty days; if she
does this after it is quick, she shall do penance for seven
years as if she were a murderess. 10 7
Henry de Bracton was an English judge on the court of coram rege,
later known as the King's Bench, from 1247-1250 and again from 12531257 A.D.1 0 8 He is generally credited with authoring a long treatise titled
De Legibus et ConsuetudinibusAngliae, or On the Laws and Customs of

103. L.J. DOWNER, INTRODUCTION TO LEGEs HENRICI PRIM) 7 (L.J. Downer ed. & trans.
1972); see also Steven D. Sargent, An examination of the laws of William the Conqueror 20 (Aug.
1976) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst) (on file with the Masters
Theses 1911 - February 2014, University of Massachusetts Amherst), https://scholarworks.
umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3071&context-theses [https://perma.cc/N758-WATF]

("In spite of its name, the work is not a collection of legislative decrees.of Henry 1. It is instead a
diligent attempt to systematize and record the law in force during the king's reign, a work of broad
scope and comprehensive intention."").
104. PATRICK WORMALD, MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW 411 (1999).
105. DOWNER, supra note 103, at 73.

106. Id. at 74.
107. DOWNER, supra note 103, at 222-23.
108. Bracton Online, Bracton: On the Laws and Customs of England, HARV. L. SCH. LB.
(Apr. 2003), http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/Bracton/index.html

GUX5].

[https://perma.cc/2KU8-
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England.109 One legal historian has called the treatise "the crown and
flower of English jurisprudence."" 0
The work mentions abortion twice:
1. "If one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her poison in
order to procure an abortion, if the foetus is already formed
or quickened, especially if it is quickened, he commits
homicide."1 1
2. "If anyone forcibly interferes with a woman's internal
organs in order to produce abortion, he is liable."" 2
The first quote has been particularly influential. For example, WM. L.
Burdick-who was once the Dean of the University of Kansas School of
Law-in his twentieth-century treatise, The Law of Crime, argued
abortion was a "crime against nature."1 1 3 He explained:
Abortion, when used as the name of a crime, is often defined
as the unlawful and intentional causing or procuring the
miscarriage of a pregnant woman, or, as otherwise said,
unlawfully causing the delivery or expulsion of the human
fetus prematurely, or before it is capable of sustaining life.
As a crime it is very ancient, punishable by both the Mosaic
and the Roman law. In the latter days of the Roman republic
one who administered medicines to procure abortion was, by
the Lex Cornelia, punishable by banishment or condemned
to labor in the state mines, and if the woman died the penalty
was death. Under the laws of Severus, in imperial times,
women who procured abortion upon themselves were
sentenced to exile.1 1 4
He rejected the common misconception that the crime of abortion "is
found only in modern treatises and modern statutes. No trace of it is to be
found in ancient common law writers."' 1 5 He began with De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae and traced its influence to Coke and then to
Hale, Hawkins, and ultimately Blackstone.1 16 He concluded that all these

109. Some historians believe others wrote parts of the work. Id.

110. Id
1 11. 2 ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (attributed to Henry de Bracton, 12101268 A.D.) (S. Thorne trans.), http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/brac-hilite.cgi?
Unframed+English+2+341+abortion [https://perma.cc/P9P6-ZVNJ].

112. Id at 408.
113. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, 3 THE LAW OF CRIME 263-93 (1946).

114. Id. at 263.
115. Id. at 265 (citation omitted).

116. Id at 266.
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abortion whereby a
commentators agreed, "that. a consummated
17
'quickened child' is killed is 'a great crime."'1
The Fleta: Seu Commentarius Juris Anglicani, or On the Common
Law of England, is an anonymous work traced to approximately 1290
A.D.11 8 The Encyclopedia Britannicaexplains:
FLETA, a treatise, with the sub-title seu Commentariusjuris
Anglicani, on the common law of England. It appears from
internal evidence, to have been written in the reign of
Edward I., about the year 1290. It is for the most part a poor
imitation of Bracton. The author is supposed to have written
it during his confinement in the Fleet prison, hence the name.
It has been conjectured that he was one of those judges who
were imprisoned for malpractices by Edward 1.119
Blackstone said that "students of the common law" paid "great
veneration and respect" to the Fleta.120
The Fleta provides:
Moreover, whoever shall have overlain a pregnant woman,
or who shall have given her drugs or blows, in such sort as
to procure abortion, or non-conception after the foetus shall
have been already formed and endowed with life, is, by law,
a homicide: And in like manner, whoever shall have given
or taken drugs to the intent that no generation or conception
may take place: Also the woman doeth homicide, who, by
potions and things of that sort, shall have destroyed her
animate child in her womb.1 2 1
Indeed, until the twentieth century, few sources explicitly tolerated
abortion. However, we do need to acknowledge two sources that support
the position that abortion was not a crime recognized by common law.
The first work, The Mirror of Justices, was published in approximately
1285 A.D.1 22 The work is often attributed to Andrew Horn, a fishmonger,
lawyer, and legal scholar.1 23 Blackstone stated Horn was "one of the most

FRANKLIN

Id. at 266-67.
Fleta, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (1911).

Id.
Introduction to BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *72.
This is a translation of sections of the Fleta provided in HORATIO R. STORER

&

1 17.
118.
119.
120.
121.

FISKE

HEARD, 2 CRIMINAL ABORTION: ITS NATURE, ITS EVIDENCE, AND ITS LAW

151

LAW 151-52 (1868).
122. ANDREW HORN, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES (attributed to Andrew Horn) (approximately
1285), reprintedin 7 SELDEN SOC'Y 139 (William Joseph Whittaker ed., 1895).
123. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirrorof Justices, 105 U. PENN. L. REV.

782 (1957).
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learned lawyers of his day."1 2 4 However, Blackstone's praise was
reserved for another one of Horn's works, Liber Horn, and not The
Mirror of Justices.125 With that context in mind, The Mirror of Justices
stated that abortion cannot be homicide because "no one can be adjudged
an infant until he has been seen in the world so that it may be known
whether he is a monster or no." 12 6
The Mirror of Justices has been discredited. Professor Dellapenna,
whose scholarship is perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the
legal history of abortion, explains:
We need not worry too much about the meaning of this
passage for the two great English legal historians, Frederick
Pollock and Frederic Maitland, writing in general terms and
without concern about abortion, dismissed The Mirrorout of
hand as "so full of fables and falsehoods that as an authority
it is worthless."1 27

'

The second work is Britton. Its authorship is disputed, but the work
was written in approximately 1290-1292 A.D.12 It suggested that
abortion was not a crime because "the name of the person against whom
the felony was committed" could not be "set forth."1 29 Professor
Dellapenna has argued that Britton was incorrect because it did not
account for a new legal instrument: the indictment. 3 0 As he explained,
"indictment was, then as now, a prosecution in the name of the king rather
than a private prosecution such as the appeal of felony." 13
D. Pro-choiceResponses
Pro-choice advocates may have various responses to our analysis.
However, we would note that some of these critiques apply with equal
force to the per curiam opinion. Therefore, to reject our use of these
historical sources is also to reject the per curiam opinion's use of these
124. BLACKSTONE, supranote 14, at *lix.
125. Id.
126. HORN, supra note 122. We would note that pre-natal medical technology has certainly
erased the question of whether the fetus is a child or a monster. Furthermore, the most obvious
reading of this passage reeks of either superstition or bias toward disabled persons.
127. DELLAPENNA, supra note 100, at 133 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK
MAITLAND, 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE EDWARD I 478 n.1 (2d ed. 1898)). We note that
Professor Dellapenna's work is not without controversy. Some scholars question his historical
analysis. See generally Carla Spivack, To "Bring Down the Flowers": The Cultural Context of
Abortion Law in Early Modern England, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 107 (2007) (criticizing
Dellapenna's claims in his 2006 book, Dispelling the Myths of Abortion History).

128. THEODORE FRANK THOMAS
(Lawbook Exchange ed., 2001).
129.

PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 265

1 BRITTON 114 (F.M.Francis Morgan Nichols ed., 1865).

130. DELLAPENNA,

131. Id.

supra note 100, at 133.
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sources as the basis for its conclusion. Indeed, the concurrence in Hodes
questioned why the per curiam opinion relied on historical sources at all,
32
reasoning that the sources are contradictory and provide little guidance.
The concurrence stated, "an originalism search gets us only so far when
divining meaning for words with such obvious open-ended qualities as
'liberty' or 'inalienable natural rights.' The historical back-and-forth
really just boils down to how much weight is given one selected fact over
another." 13 3 The concurrence offered a typical critique of originalism:
The historical record is often contradictory and, therefore, judges with a
3 4
results-oriented approach are not constrained by history.
Other possible objections are: (1) there were relatively few
prosecutions for abortion; (2) sometimes abortion prosecutions occurred
in ecclesiastic court; (3) many commentators thought abortion was only
a misdemeanor; and (4) abortion was punished primarily because it was
associated with sexual promiscuity.1 3 5 Another objection might be that
many of the sources have religious undertones and that, as such, their
reach should be limited.
Why some of these points matter is unclear. Even assuming that there
were few prosecutions, which is a questionable assertion,1 3 6 and that
some of the prosecutions occurred in ecclesiastic court, 137 the
procurement of an abortion still violated the common law. And even if it
were a mere misdemeanor, that an act is not a felony does not elevate it
to the status of a natural right. Admittedly, there is much discussion
regarding whether an abortion before quickening violated the common
law; 13 8 however, we doubt that pro-choice advocates would accept the
illegality of abortions post-quickening.
As for the religious undertones of Locke, Coke, and Blackstone, we
note that Hodes relied on these sources. 13 9 We are merely employing the
same methodology used by the court. A pro-choice advocate cannot reject
our historical analysis on the ground that we rely on sources with
religious undertones unless he or she is also prepared to reject the per
curiam opinion in Hodes. Furthermore, given natural law's history,
many-maybe most-historical sources on the matter have religious
132. See Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 503-17 (Kan. 2019) (Biles, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Skylar Reese Croy, Comment, The Problem of Change: Rethinking Critiques of "New
Originalism," DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE, MAR. 2019, at 114 (2019).
135. See generally Spivack, supra note 127, at 109-10, 133-34, 142-43.

136. See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 100.
137. Id. at 143.
138. See, e.g., Mark S. Scott, Note, Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent
Roe Attempted and Failed to Use, 1 MICH. L. & PoL'Y REV. 199, 200 (1996); Shelley Gavigan,
The Criminal Sanction as It Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of the Statutory
Prohibition ofAbortion, 5 J. LEGAL HMST. 20,21-22 (1984).

139. See Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 517 (Kan. 2019) (Stegall, J., dissenting).
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undertones. For example, Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar and
Catholic priest, is often considered one of natural law's "principal
architects and leading spokesmen."1 40 Additionally, the Declaration of
Independence discusses "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."1 4 1
Natural law presumes there is a structured, inherent order from which we
can deduce certain transcendental principles. In summarizing the views
of Aquinas, one scholar explained:
Natural law is a "dictate of reason commanding something."
It is discoverable by the use of reason to discern what is good
and what is evil. Natural law is a rational man's participation
in God's wisdom, and God's wisdom is the eternal law
because it ordains and directs the man to the ultimate ends,
which are happiness and the common good.1 4 2
If a pro-choice advocate were to object to the religious undertones in
some of the sources Hodes and we discuss, they would seemingly have
to reject reliance on natural law in general.
But the most straightforward response to the concurrence and other
pro-choice points is this: before Roe v. Wade,1 4 3 there existed a near
millennium of statements in the historical record that condemned
abortion and only a small number of specific statements-which were not
influential-that tolerated abortion. Indeed, neither The Mirror of
Justices nor Britton advocated that abortion was morally sound: they
advocate that abortion might be legal for technical reasons.
E. Specific Governs Over General
So, contrary to the concurrence in Hodes, there is a debate in the
historical record only if general statements from the record are relied on
while specific statements are ignored. Indeed, the strongest objection to
pro-choice scholars' reading of the historical record may be that they
have few statements they can point to-especially if The Mirror of
Justices and Britton are unconvincing-that demonstrate a right to
procure an abortion. Instead, pro-choice scholars have to author books
and law review articles claiming that specific statements from the likes

140. Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of

JudicialReview, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2269 (2001).
141. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
142. Ulyana Yuryevna Altbregen, Abortion: The Conflict of Positive Law with NaturalLaw
andAquinas, 2016 AVE MARiA INT'L L. REV. J. 66,70 (2016).

143. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of Coke were wrong.144 We note that this misreading of the historical
record largely started in Roe and continues to this day. 145
Hodes never acknowledged specific statements from many sources,
instead letting general statements govern. In doing so, Hodes violated one
of the basic tenants of reasoning: when there is an apparent conflict
46
between a general rule and a specific rule, the specific rule controls.1
Lawyers and judges utilize this tenant in all sorts of applications. As one
commentator stated, "the specific" is to be "construed simply to impose
restrictions and limitations on the general." 47 And this tenet is wholly
familiar to Kansas courts who employ it when construing statutes,1 48
contracts,1 49 and pleadings.1 5 0 Common sense requires the employment
of this tenet when attempting to divine whether a natural right exists by
examining the writings of Locke, Coke, and Blackstone. If the tenet is not
to be employed, then there is little reason for referring to the sources at
all. Of course, Hodes could have explained why the specific statements
no longer govern, but, for unknown reasons, it did not.
Interestingly, Hodes was not entirely blind to some specific statements
made by these sources. The court went to great lengths to explain why
certain specific misogynistic statements from these jurists and
philosophers no longer govern. For example, Hodes acknowledged that
Blackstone said that a husband was lawfully permitted "to restrain a wife
of her liberty." 151 Hodes then stated that "we cannot ignore the prevailing
views justifying widespread legal differentiation between the
sexes ... and the reality that these views were reflected in policies
impacting women's ability to exercise their rights of personal autonomy,
144. DELLAPENNA, supra note 100, at 135; John Keown, Back to the Future ofAbortion Law:

Roe's Rejection of America's History and Traditions, 22 ISsuES L. & MED. 3 (2006).
145. See, e.g., Ostler, supra note 101; Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme
Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 814 (1973) ("[T]he Court's understanding of the AngloAmerican history of the law of abortion is both distorted and incomplete."); id. at 814-39
(outlining, in great detail, the historical errors in Roe); Robert A. Destro, Note, Abortion and the
Constitution: The Need for a Life-ProtectiveAmendment, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1250, 1267-82 (1975).

146. E.g.,

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

LEGAL TExTS 183 (2012) ("If there is a conflict between a general provision. and a specific

provision, the specific provision prevails .... ").
147. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATIONS 106-07 (1882).
148. See State v. Carpenter, 453 P.3d 865, 868 (Kan. 2019) ("'[L]aw is clear that a
specific provision within a statute controls over a more general provision within the statute."')

(quoting State v. Baber, 44 Kan. App. 2d 748, 753, 240 P.3d 980 (2010).
149. Exch. State Bank v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 177 P.3d 1284, 1285 (Kan. Ct. App.
2008) ("'Specific provisions in a contract control over general ones[.]"') (quoting Colburn v.

Parker& ParsleyDev. Co., 17 Kan. App. 2d 638, 649, 842 P.2d 321 (1992)).
150. State ex rel. Fatzer v. Sinclair Pipe Line Co., 304 P.2d 930, 936 (Kan. 1956) ("Also that
where specific allegations conflict with general allegations the specific allegations control.").
151. Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 490 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting BLACKSTONE,
supra note 14, at *445).
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including their right to decide whether to continue a pregnancy."1 5 2 But
no one today would suggest that these misogynistic views have any place
in our jurisprudence. So, in a sense, Hodes committed a straw man
fallacy: it set up an absurd argument, just to knock it down. We suspect
that the court would have had a much harder time addressing, for
example., Blackstone's statement that "[l]ife is the immediate gift of God,
a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in
contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's
womb." 15 3 But, by selecting which specific statements to review, Hodes
was able to artificially strengthen its reasoning.
When general governs over specific, absurdity follows because a
broad principle is applied to specific circumstances. 5 4 For instance, the
reason there is a legitimate argument that assisted suicide is now a
constitutionally protected right in Kansas stems from the general
statements about the right to bodily autonomy governing over specific
statements. This is a dangerous path that the Kansas Supreme Court is
pursuing; it is untenable and must be stopped.
III. WHY HODES MATTERS

In this Part, we examine why Hodes' error matters. First, it fulfills a
prediction made by scholars over a decade ago: pro-choice advocates will
effectively promote abortion rights in state court by relying on the right
to bodily autonomy.1 5 5 Second, it serves as an example of how not to
interpret a natural rights guarantee judges should exercise caution and
restraint before acknowledging a natural right.
A. Abortion Litigation'sShift to State Courts
Pro-choice advocates who seek to challenge state-specific restrictions
have shifted some of their resources from federal court to state court.' 56
The shift is partly a response to Roe's uncertain future.1 57 Additionally,
even if Roe survives the test of time, litigating abortion rights in the state
courts has a couple of distinct advantages.
1. Roe's Nebulous Future
Roe is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court opinion that stated that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a woman's right
152. Id. at 491.
153. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at * 129.
154. See generally Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); Comm'r
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (discussing the absurdity doctrine).
155. Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The IntriguingFederalistFuture ofReproductive

Rights, 88 B.U. L. REV. 175, 183-86 (2008).
156. Id. at 176-77.
157. Id. at 185-86.
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to procure an abortion.1 58 However, since its inception, the story of Roe
has been one of "decline."' 5 9 And the viability of Roe is a constant subject
of discussion 160 A host of commentators have argued that it should be
overturned.161 As one commentator stated:
Despite forty-five years, Roe has never become settled.
There has never been consistency in this Court's application
of Roe . . . . Two of the justices who originally
joined Roe subsequently recanted in whole or in part and
virtually every abortion decision since Harrisv. McRae has
been closely divided.1 62
Even pro-choice members of the legal profession have criticized
Roe's legal analysis.1 63 One scholar criticized Roe "because it is bad
constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives
almost no sense of an obligation to try to be."164 Others, including Dean
Erwin Chemerinsky, offer an enthusiastic defense of a woman's
constitutional right to procure an abortion; 165 however, even Dean
Chemerinsky detects that "[a]bortion rights in the United States are in
serious jeopardy."1 6 6
All this attention on Roe is not without good cause either. In Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey,1 67 the Court said it upheld the "essential holding"
of Roe.1 68 In reality, "the Court actually backed away from affording
women the highest level of constitutional protection for the abortion

158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
159. See Moss & Raines, supra note 155, at 181-85.
160. See generally Paul Benjamin Linton, The Pro-Life Movement at (Almost) Fifty: Where
Do We Go From Here?, 18 AVE MARIA L. REV. 15, 21 (2020) (describing a slate of state laws
that seek to limit access to abortion in a manner that would directly challenge Roe's holding).
161. Clarke D. Forsythe, A Draft Opinion Overruling Roe v. Wade, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB.

POL'Y 445, 447 (2018) (arguing that Roe ought to be overruled for recognizing a constitutional
right to "terminate pregnancy").

162. Id. at 450-51.
163. See Moss & Raines, supra note 155, at 183-85.

164. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 947 (1973).
165. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman's Private

Choice, 95 TEX. L. REv. 1189, 1198 (2017).
166. Id at 1189.
167. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
168. Id. at 846.
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choice." 169 And notably, the Court currently has five justices that have
voted-to varying degrees-to limit abortion rights. 17 0
Chief Justice John Roberts' abortion jurisprudence is the most
peculiar. In 2016, he dissented from an opinion in Whole Woman's
Health v. Hellerstedt,171 striking down a state law that (1) required
abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty
miles of the abortion clinic, and (2) required abortion clinics to meet the
minimum standards for ambulatory surgical centers. 17 2 However, in June
Medical Services LLC v. Russo, 173 the Court's most recent abortion
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts was one of five votes to strike down a
similar law.17 4 The Court fractured in June Medical Services with a fourjustice plurality concluding that the law was unconstitutional.7 5
Seemingly, the only reason Chief Justice Roberts concurred was that he
viewed the case as already decided: "The question today however is not
whether Whole Woman's Health was right or wrong, but whether to
adhere to it in deciding the present case." 176 In his concurrence, Chief
Justice Roberts doubled down on the assertion that Whole Woman's
Health was, in fact, wrongly decided: "I joined the dissent in Whole
Woman's Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly
decided."1 77 So, at the very least, Chief Justice Roberts is open to
restricting abortion in some circumstances. 17 8 Therefore, commentators
on both sides of the abortion debate anxiously await Chief Justice
Roberts's vote in the most recent abortion case to come before the Court,
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization,which was argued not
long ago.1 7 9

169. Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey:

Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1154
(1993) ("[By] changing the standard of review used to evaluate the constitutionality of abortion
regulations, the Justices in Casey rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review mandated
by Roe, adopting instead the more permissive 'undue burden' standard. Under this new standard,
the right to choose abortion is no longer a fundamental right and thus, women seeking abortions
are no longer entitled to the strong protections afforded other fundamental rights, such as the right
to free speech and the right to vote." (footnotes omitted)).
170. See, e.g., June Med. Servs., LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2142, 2153 (2020).

171. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016).
172. Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Samuel Alito's dissent in Whole Woman's Health.

Id. at 2330-53 (Alito, J., dissenting). He also voted to uphold a federal ban on partial birth
abortions. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
173. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (plurality).
174. Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment).
175. Id. (plurality).
176. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment).

177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
179. Docket No. 19-1392 (argued Dec. 1, 2021).
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As for the other "conservative" Justices, both Justices Clarence
Thomas and Samuel Alito have voted to uphold every abortion restriction
to come before the Court during their respective tenures. 180 Two of the
Court's three newest members, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett
Kavanaugh, have done the same in their one opportunity.1 81 The third,
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, indicated at her confirmation hearing that she
did not consider Roe one of the Court's "super precedents."1 8 2
We think Roe is unlikely to be overruled outright; however, it might
suffer a slow, plodding demise. 8 3 Based on the oral argument in Dobbs,
it appears likely that Roe will be limited.1 84 Therefore, pro-choice
advocates intensely desire to obtain a sort of state-level "insurance
policy." That way, even if Roe is limited and state regulations become so
pervasive that access to abortion is effectively eliminated, pro-choice
advocates can turn to state courts for a determination of whether statespecific laws protect the right to procure an abortion.
2. Advantages Offered by State Courts
Roe's nebulous future is not the only reason that pro-choice advocates
are turning to state court. State courts have distinct advantages.' 85 First,
based on what has happened so far in state courts-in Hodes and other
cases-pro-choice advocates tend not only to win but also to obtain
broader protection for abortion rights than in federal court. 186 Second, in
addition to the same arguments that could be made in federal court, in
light of Hodes, guaranteed natural rights guarantees provide an easy, even

180. June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2142-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2153-71 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2330-53 (2016) (5-3
decision) (Alito, J., dissenting); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167-69 (Thomas, J., concurring).
181. June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2176 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
182. Brian Naylor, Barrett Says She Does Not Consider Roe V. Wade 'Super-Precedent,'
NPR (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-courtconfirmation/2020/10/13/923355142/barrett-says-abortion-rights-decision-not-a-super-precedent

[https://perma.cc/KG5K-57WA].
183. Serena Mayeri, Opinion, How Abortion Rights Will Die a Death by 1,000 Cuts, N.Y.

TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-abortionrights-roe-casey.html [https://perma.cc/926V-6BRG].
184. Amy Howe, Majority of Court Appears Poised to Roll back Abortion Rights,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/12/majority-of-court-appears-

poised-to-uphold-mississippis-ban-on-most-abortions-after-15-weeks/
YTEM].

[https://perma.cc/AD4S-

185. See Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for

Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 527 (2009).
186. See id. at 512.
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if misguided, entry point on which to base the claim. 187 Third, as a matter
of standing, pursuing an abortion claim in state court is easier. 188
a. Broader Protection in State Court
Pro-choice advocates tend not only to win in state court but also to
obtain broader protection for abortion rights than they would in federal
court.1 89 As previously mentioned, Kansas is not the only state to protect
abortion under its state constitution. 190 Furthermore, the vast majority of
these states review abortion restrictions more strictly than the federal
courts would.1 9 1
In federal court, a party defending a law that restricts access to
abortion must demonstrate that the law does not present an "undue
burden" to a woman seeking an abortion. 19 2 Undue burden is "shorthand
for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus." 19 3 Meanwhile, of the eleven states that have
recognized a right to procure an abortion under their state constitutions,
eight of them, including Kansas, review a law restricting access to

187. See id at 499.
188. See Mary Ziegler, The Question No One is Asking About the Supreme Court and

Abortion, WASH. POST (Mar 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/ 03/05/
question-no-one-is-asking-about-supreme-court-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/LR9K-W84T].
189. See Wharton, supranote 185, at 512.
190. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904,

909, 913 (Alaska 2001); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84 (Cal.
1981); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v.
Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 237 (Iowa 2018); Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417

N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981); Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 32 (Minn.
1995); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 666 (Miss. 1998); Armstrong v. State, 989
P.2d 364, 384 (Mont. 1999); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 933-34 (N.J. 1982); Hope
v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 186 (N.Y. 1994).
191. In Kansas, specifically:
[T]he standard of judicial review adopted by the court in Hodes is so rigorous
that it is likely to unsettle existing abortion law in Kansas and result in a legal
landscape for abortion in this state that is more permissive of abortion than either
the current federal standard or the original federal standard established by Roe v.

Wade.
Elizabeth Kirk, Impact of the StrictScrutiny Standardof JudicialReview on Abortion Legislation
Under the Kansas Supreme Court'sDecision in Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, CHARLOTTE LOZIER
INST. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://lozierinstitute.org/impact-of-the-strict-scrutiny-standard-of-judicial
-review-on-abortion-legislation-under-the-kansas-supreme-courts-decision-in-hodes-nauser-vschmidt/ [https://perma.cc/G4HB-4XMS].

192. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(plurality).
193. Id.
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abortion under the strict scrutiny standard.1 94 This is a much harder test
for an abortion regulation to pass. Strict scrutiny is the "most rigid
scrutiny" and the "most exacting judicial examination." 195 To review a
law under strict scrutiny is almost certainly to doom the law. As the
popular saying goes, "strict in theory, fatal in fact."' 96 This is all to say,
if a pro-choice advocate goes to state court, the reviewing court might
adopt a stricter standard of review than the current federal standard.
As one article put it, state courts have the ability to:
[I]nterpret their [own] constitutions as protecting privacy
and autonomy rights derive[d] both from the text and from
the history of those charters. State constitutions often contain
provisions either absent from the Federal Constitution or
more expansively written than those in the Federal
Constitution. Further, each state constitution was enacted
under unique historical conditions that sometimes evidence
a particular concern with establishing broad privacy or
autonomy rights. 197
Accordingly, there is a strong sense that the battle over abortion rights
will move from the federal court to state court.
Furthermore, an opinion from a state supreme court acknowledging
broader protection may influence other courts. Some even argue that
"[c]utting-edge state law precedent may also influence federal courts,
including the Supreme Court itself." 198 Therefore, cementing a legal
foundation for broader protection at the state level is a decent strategy for
pro-choice advocates hoping to achieve a nationwide impact.
b. Natural Rights Guarantees
Notably, most of the states that have protected the right to procure an
abortion under their state constitution have grounded the right in the right

194. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d at 909; Planned Parenthood of the

Heartland, 915 N.W.2d at 241; Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 466 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam);
Women of State of Minn. by Doe, 542 N.W.2d at 31; Pro-Choice Miss., 716 So. 2d at 654-55;

Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374; Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 934; Hope, 634 N.E.2d at 186.
195. Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285,

288 (2015) (citations omitted).
196. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving

Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
197. See, e.g., Moss & Raines, supra note 155, at 203.

198. Wharton, supra note 185, at 528-29. Additionally, the fifty states do not exist in a
vacuum, and in the context of abortion litigation, "state courts repeatedly note[] that they were [

influenced in their decision making by the outcomes in sister states." Id. at 528.
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to privacy,1 99 and none have gone as far as Kansas in declaring the right
a natural right. That means that Hodes could serve as an example for
achieving even broader protection than the already broad protection
offered by many states. In essence, all the arguments that could be made
in federal court can also be made in state court, but the inverse is not true.
As previously mentioned, Hodes relied on Section 1 of the Kansas
Constitution Bill of Rights, which provides: "All men are possessed of
equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness." 200 The first question that the court answered was
whether this clause is merely prefatory or whether it protects substantive
rights. 20 1 Hodes concluded the latter was true. Now, if the Kansas
constitution were the only one to contain such language, pro-choice
advocates would not get very far using this line of argument. However,
an additional thirty-three states have either identical or substantially
similar language in their respective state constitutions. 2 02 These
constitutional provisions provide an additional anchor-point by which to
bring a challenge to an abortion regulation. 2 03
c. Standing in State Courts
Third, litigating abortion rights in state court is easier as a matter of
standing. Broadly speaking, who has standing determines who has the
"right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or
right." 204 That is to say, a party has no ability to challenge a law in court
without standing. 20 5 For a party to have standing in federal court,
generally, the party must satisfy the Article III standing
requirements. 206 If the party is unable to meet these requirements, they
cannot bring their cause in federal court.
199. Moss & Raines, supra note 155, at 197-203 (noting that Alaska, California, Florida,
Montana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, and, arguably, New York have
protected abortion under the right to privacy).

200. Hodes v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 466 (2019) (per curiam) (quoting KAN. CONST. art. 1,

§ 1).

201. Id. at 466 ("We are now asked: Is this declaration of rights more than an idealized
aspiration? And, if so, do the substantive rights include a woman's right to make decisions about
her body, including the decision whether to continue her pregnancy? We answer these questions,

'Yes.'").
202. Supra note 21.
203. Moss & Raines, supra note 155.
204. Standing, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
205. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]he core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article Ill
[of the United State Constitution].").
206. Id at 560-61 ("First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) "actual or imminent,
not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,"' Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury
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However, in the context of abortion litigation, litigants can typically
argue that they have third-party standing (one of the exceptions to
general Article III standing requirements). That is, the U.S. Supreme
Court has "generally permitted plaintiffs to assert third-party rights in
cases where the 'enforcement of the challenged restriction against the
litigantwould result indirectly in the violation of third parties' rights."' 207
But allowing abortion providers to pursue their patients' claims is not
without debate, and there are currently four justices who would not allow
third-party standing at least in some circumstances. 208 In June Medical
Services, Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh explained that
they would never reach the merits of the case because they would deny
that the plaintiffs even have standing to sue. 2 09 Therefore, "the restrictive
standing model in federal courts creates a number of circumstances in
constitutional violation by the government may go
which a potential
2 10
unchallenged."
In contrast, it is much easier for plaintiffs to establish standing in
state court. That is because "many states have adopted a comparatively
lax doctrine that permits citizens to sue for generalized grievances." 21 1
Furthermore, "many state courts have developed and successfully
employed alternative standing models that allow citizens or taxpayers to
sue on behalf of the public interest in cases involving issues of great
constitutional importance." 2 12 Therefore, in contrast with federal court, in
state court the plaintiff often just needs to be a taxpayer of the state. Thus,
nearly anyone can bring an action in state court.

and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be
"redressed by a favorable decision." (citations and quotes sources omitted; alterations and ellipses

in original)).
207. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2118-19 (2020) (plurality) (quoting
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004)).
208. See, e.g., id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Under a proper understanding of Article
111, these plaintiffs lack standing to invoke our jurisdiction."); id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("1
would remand the case to the District Court and instruct that court, before proceeding any further,

to require the joinder of a plaintiff with standing."); and id. at 2173 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("No
one even attempts to suggest this usual [standing] prerequisite is satisfied here."). Justice

.

Kavanaugh joined Justice Alito's dissent.
209. Id. at 2142, 2 15 3 , 21 7 3
210. John DiManno, Note, Beyond Taxpayers' Suits: Public InterestStanding in the States,

41 CONN. L. REV. 639, 639 (2008).
211. Peter N. Salib & David K. Suska, The Federal-StateStanding Gap: How to Enforce

Federal Law in Federal Court Without Article III Standing, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1155,
1169 (2018) (citing M. Ryan Harmanis, Note, States' Stances on Public Interest Standing, 76
OHIo ST. L.J. 729, 739 (2015)).
212. DiManno, supra note 210, at 639.
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B. The Significance of Taking Away a NaturalRight
We are further concerned that Hodes casually recognized a natural
right to abortion and, thereby, declared that Bill 95 was illegitimate as
contrary to nature itself. As previously mentioned, natural rights are those
rights that predate government. That idea forms the very cornerstone of
the nation-a cornerstone still in existence today. 2 13 One of the prevailing
theories of the American governmental system is that the citizenry will
form a government to better secure these rights. Indeed, the founding
fathers believed that the entire object of government is to protect those
rights. James Wilson said: "I here close my examination into those natural
rights, which, in my humble opinion, it is the business of civil
government to protect, and not to subvert, and the exercise of which it is
the duty of civil government to enlarge, and not to restrain." 2 14 He was
not alone in that belief.215
Therefore, based on the founding fathers' premises, when the
government takes away or restricts a natural right, it acts contrary to its
legitimate purpose. That is no minor transgression. The founding fathers
were keenly aware of that and so sought to design a system that made it
difficult for those types of transgressions to occur. As James Madison
stated, "[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself." 2 16 The purpose of requiring the government to regulate
itself was to prevent the State from enacting laws that "violate the
inherent or 'natural' rights of those to whom they are directed." 21" To
accomplish that goal, the structure of government contains "procedural
protections of these rights." 2 18 For example, three governmental powers
are divided among the three branches of government, not to promote

213. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."). As recently
as 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that some rights "predated the creation of the

Federal Government[.]" McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010).
214. Wilson, supra note 9, at 335.
21.5. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the

governed[.]"); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) ("An ACT of the
Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.").
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (1788).
217. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 54.
218. Id.; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) ("The Framers recognized
that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving

liberty.").
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efficiency but to prevent tyranny. 2 19 That is, one of the primary purposes
for partitioning governmental power in this way was to "protect the
individual." 22 0 Moreover:
The Framers were concerned not just with the starting
allocation [of these powers], but with the "gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department."
It was this fear that prompted the Framers to build
checks and balances into our constitutional structure, so that
the branches could defend their powers on an ongoing

basis. 2 2 1

When Hodes declared a natural right to abortion, it was in effect
declaring that any governmental act that sought to subvert the exercise of
that right was contra naturam. But judges should not be too quick to
assume that every restriction on "liberty" is an illegitimate restriction on
a natural right. This is especially true in a properly functioning republican
government with checks and balances designed to limit the government's
ability to infringe on those natural liberties. 222
More importantly, judges should also be cautious in acknowledging a
natural right. Indeed, one early U.S. Supreme Court justice explained,
"[t]he ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject." 2 2 3 As such,
when the judiciary acknowledges the existence of a natural right, it could
224
be fairly described as an opportunity to engage in judicial activism.
However, the natural rights guarantees that exist in the majority of
state constitutions create somewhat of a necessity for judges to inquire
about natural rights. Guarantees of natural rights have a long and storied
history in this country. They first appeared in the Virginia Declaration of
Rights in 1776 and quickly spread throughout the states. 2 25 Importantly,
these clauses do "not function as simply vague, preambular language but
[are] instead applied with varying degrees of judicial vigor to decide
some of the most challenging and controversial issues of the day. "226
Accordingly, natural rights guarantees cannot be read out of their
219. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) ("This 'separation of powers' was
obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was, on
the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against tyranny.").

220. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011).
221. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 74 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).

222. See generally.BARNETT, supranote 4, at 44.
223. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
224. See Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 141, 177 (2001)
("[N]atural law is open to the same abuses that judicial activism engenders.").

225. Calabresi & Vickery, supra note 20, at 1316-17.
226. Id. at 1436-40.

105

AN UNNATURAL READING

2021 ]

'

respective constitutions; however, natural law can exacerbate judicial
activism because it is a challenging study. 227 The dangers of judicial
recognition of natural rights are amplified in an age of impact litigation.
Such litigation is a well-established mechanism for advancing abortion
rights. 22 8
While the language of these clauses is quite clear, it is also openended: "All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights,
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 229 The list of
rights is not exhaustive, and that was intentional because it is impossible
to enumerate all the natural rights that a person possesses. Generally,
"natural rights define a private domain within which persons may do as
they please, provided their conduct does not encroach upon the rightful
domain of others." 230 Consequently, "people have a right to do whatever
they please within the boundaries defined by natural rights, this means
that the rights retained by the people are limited only by their imagination
and could never be completely specified or enumerated." 23
Therefore, how is a judge to determine whether conduct qualifies as a
"natural right"? They should heed the advice of Reconstruction-Era
Senator John Sherman, who said judges should:
[L]ook first at the Constitution of the United States as the
primary fountain of authority. If that does not define the right
they will look for the unenumerated powers to the
Declaration of American Independence, to every scrap of
American history, to the history of England, to the common
law of England, the old decisions of Lords Mansfield and
Holt, and so on back to the earliest recorded decisions of the
common law. There they will find the fountain and reservoir
of the rights of Americans as English citizens. 2 3 2
That is to say, judges should exercise caution and restraint before
declaring a natural right-and they should do so only after an exhaustive
search of the historical record. If they fail to do so, they may create more
problems than they solve. And that certainly appears to be the case in
Hodes.
If the historical record is unclear, a judge will have to make a
judgment call on what natural law demands, a question much better suited
227. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 224, at 177.
228. PETER H. SCHUCK ET AL., MEDITATIONS OF A MILITANT MODERATE: COOL VIEWS ON

HoT ToPics 103 (2006) (describing impact litigation as "lawsuits that seek to use the effect
widespread social changes" and pointing to Roe as an "icon[] of impact litigation").
229. KAN. CONST. art. II, § 1.
230. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 58.

231. Id.
232. Senator Sherman's speech and its historical context are discussed in BARNETT, supra
note 4, at 66-67.
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for the political branches. Therefore, it is best for the judiciary not to
decide lest it step into the role of a super-legislature. 233 Indeed, even
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has critiqued Roe for going too far and
causing unnecessary controversy. 234 In one law review article, she wrote
that the "sweep and detail" of Roe resulted in the "mobilization of a rightto-life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state
legislatures." 2 35 In another law review article, she explained:
Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, may
prove unstable. The most prominent example in recent
decades is Roe v. Wade....
The seven to two judgment in Roe v. Wade declared
"violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" a Texas criminal abortion statute that
intolerably shackled a woman's autonomy; the Texas law
"except[ed] from criminality only a life-saving procedure on
behalf of the [pregnant woman]." Suppose the Court had
stopped there, rightly -declaring unconstitutional the most
extreme brand of law in the nation, and had not gone on, as
the Court did in Roe, to fashion a regime blanketing the
subject, a set of rules that displaced virtually every state law
then in force. Would there have been the twenty-year
controversy we have witnessed, reflected most recently in
the Supreme Court's splintered decision in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey? A less encompassing Roe, one that
merely struck down the extreme Texas law and went no
further on that day, we believe and will summarize wh,
might have served to reduce rather than fuel controversy.2
Hodes' reasoning is even more sensational than Roe. Calling a right
natural implies that all who oppose it have taken a stance contrary to
nature. As such, natural rights cannot be opposed by those educated on
the subject and who have good character. Yet, there is no shortage of
educated people, of good character, who object on moral grounds to
abortion. When judges go too far, they can inadvertently sensationalize
an issue.
CONCLUSION

To conclude, natural rights guarantees are not an authorization for
judges to act, in the words of the late Justice Antonin Scalia (referencing
233. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185

(1992).
234. Id. at 1198-99.
235. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.

Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985).
236. Ginsburg, supra note 233, at 1198-99 (citations omitted).
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Plato), as "philosopher kings." 23 7 If state courts are to turn to natural
rights guarantees as a source of substantive rights, they must do so with
great care and humility. They must fairly and thoroughly consider the
historical record, and specific statements on the topic in question must
govern. If the historical record is ambiguous, they should let the political
branches decide the issue. Otherwise, especially in an age of impact
litigation, they step outside their constitutional lane and become superlegislators.

237. Justice Scalia Honors U.S. Constitution, GW TODAY (Sept. 18, 2013),
https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/justice-scalia-honors-us-constitution [https://perma.cc/EL6A-34B8].

